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A CONSTITUTION FOR THE AGE OF DEMAGOGUES: USING 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO REMOVE AN UNFIT 
PRESIDENT 
PAUL F. CAMPOS† 
“[O]f those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, 
the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obse-
quious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and end-
ing tyrants.” 
  Federalist No. 11 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that, properly understood, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment is designed to allow the Executive and Legislative Branches, 
working together, to remove a president from office when it becomes evi-
dent that the person elevated to that office by the electoral process is man-
ifestly unsuited for what can, without exaggeration, be described as the 
most important job in the world. 
It argues further that the first two years of Donald Trump’s presi-
dency have provided a great deal of evidence for the proposition that Pres-
ident Trump has, in fact, demonstrated the requisite level of fundamental 
unfitness for the office that would justify using the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment to remove him. This Article also argues that the cultural conditions 
that brought President Trump to office make it far from unlikely that other 
occasions to use the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in this way will arise in the 
foreseeable future. 
Our contemporary legal and political culture should embrace the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, suitably modified by congressional legislation, 
as an appropriately powerful tool to deal with the present and future forms 
of radical legal and political dysfunction. In short, the presidency of the 
United States is too important of a job not to allow for a process—beyond 
quadrennial elections and quasi-criminal impeachment trials—by which 
the American people can say to a president, through its elected represent-
atives: You’re fired.  
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  INTRODUCTION 
On February 27, 2019, the American public was transfixed by a fas-
cinating and disturbing spectacle. In nationally televised testimony, Mi-
chael Cohen, the former personal attorney to the President of the United 
States, outlined how, in effect, the President operated much like the boss 
of a mafia family, with Cohen playing the role of consigliere. “I am 
ashamed because I know what Mr. Trump is. He is a racist. He is a con-
man. He is a cheat,” Cohen told the House Oversight Committee.2 
Cohen testified that Donald Trump ordered him to threaten hundreds 
of people, reported that working for Trump meant lying became as natural 
as breathing, and that Cohen received instructions in a kind of mob-style 
code. For instance, he testified that, during the 2016 presidential cam-
paign, Trump knew that his organization was pursuing a projected Mos-
cow real-estate project and asked Cohen about the deal repeatedly—a deal 
from which Trump stood to gain, according to Cohen, “hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars . . . .”3 Cohen revealed that Trump had directed him to lie 
to Congress about the transaction:  
In conversations we had during the campaign, at the same time I was 
actively negotiating in Russia for him, he would look me in the eye 
and tell [sic] me there’s no business in Russia and then go out and lie 
to the American people by saying the same thing.4 
According to Cohen’s sworn testimony, the soon–to–be President of 
the United States suborned perjury before Congress to hide from the public 
that he was financially entangled with a nation that, according to the unan-
imous conclusion of the American intelligence community, meddled in the 
  
 2. Sabrina Siddiqui et al., Michael Cohen Accuses ‘Racist, Conman’ Trump of Criminal Con-
spiracy, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/feb/27/michael-co-
hen-donald-trump-testimony-latest-news. 
 3. Matt Zapotosky et al., Michael Cohen Concludes His Testimony: ‘I Will Not Sit Back’, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/mi-
chael-cohen-testimony/2019/02/27/089664f0-39fb-11e9-a2cd-307b06d0257b_story.html?noredi-
rect=on. 
 4. Erin Schaff, Full Transcript: Michael Cohen’s Opening Statement to Congress, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/politics/cohen-documents-testimony.html. 
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2016 election on Donald Trump’s behalf.5 In the words of a declassified 
version of a highly classified document that was provided to the President 
in January of 2017 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the National Security Administration 
(NSA): 
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence cam-
paign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals 
were to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, deni-
grate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presi-
dency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed 
a clear preference for President–elect Trump. We have high confi-
dence in these judgments.6 
Cohen also produced signed checks from President Trump, reimburs-
ing Cohen in 2017 for payments he made to Stormy Daniels—a porno-
graphic film actress. Daniels claims she was paid off by President Trump 
in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign to remain silent about a sexual 
encounter she had with the President a few months after the birth of his 
youngest child.7 Such undisclosed payments would constitute a violation 
of campaign finance laws.8  
Testimony went on for many hours, and Cohen ended it with a 
chilling statement. President Trump’s personal “fixer”—the man who had 
been as close to Trump as anyone for more than a decade—had this to say 
about the possible consequences of next year’s presidential election: 
“Given my experience working for Mr. Trump, I fear that if he loses the 
election in 2020, that there will never be a peaceful transition of power.”9 
Cohen’s prediction threw new light on a statement made less than 
two weeks earlier by Harvard Law Professor Emeritus Alan Dershowitz. 
Professor Dershowitz appeared on Fox News, and excoriated various fed-
eral Executive Branch officials who, according to several sources, had dis-
cussed the possibility of using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution to remove President Trump from office. Dershowitz re-
marked: 
You know, these guys are watching ‘House of Cards’ instead of read-
ing the Constitution . . . . The Constitution is clear as can be. The 25th 
  
 5. Id.; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITY AND 
INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS, at i–iii (2017). 
 6. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 5, at ii. 
 7. Chris Mergerian et al., Michael Cohen Showcases Check He Says Trump Wrote for Stormy 
Daniels Hush Money, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
pol-cohen-testifies-implicates-trump-check-stormy-20190227-story.html. 
 8. Peter Overby, Trump and Campaign Finance Law: The Fundamentals Still Apply, NPR 
(May 3, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/03/608110757/trump-and-campaign-finance-
law-the-fundamentals-still-apply. 
 9. Sanjana Karanth, Michael Cohen Worries There Won’t Be ‘Peaceful Transition of Power’ 
If Trump Loses in 2020, HUFFPOST (Feb. 27, 2019, 5:56 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mi-
chael-cohen-testimony-2020-trump_n_5c7710b2e4b0d3a48b564439. 
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Amendment is applicable only if you're incapacitated . . . . It's not a 
substitute for impeachment, it's not a substitute for an election and if 
[Deputy Attorney General] Rod Rosenstein actually thought about and 
suggested wiring the [P]resident, invoking the 25th Amendment, he 
should be fired before he has the opportunity to resign. He should be 
disgraced.10 
Dershowitz’s comments were cited by President Trump later that 
evening when the President employed the social media platform, Twitter, 
to distribute the following statement to his fifty-nine million Twitter fol-
lowers: 
Trying to use the 25th Amendment to try and circumvent the Election 
is a despicable act of unconstitutional power grabbing [ . . . ] which 
happens in third world countries. You have to obey the law. This is an 
attack on our system & Constitution. Alan Dershowitz. @TuckerCarl-
son11 
Professor Dershowitz and President Trump’s statements that it would 
be unconstitutional to remove a president through the use of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment for any reason other than a narrowly defined “incapac-
ity” are wrong as a matter of constitutional law. Their interpretation re-
flects an unhistorical rejection of the very reasons why the Amendment 
was adopted in the first place. 
In fact, it would be perfectly constitutional for President Trump to be 
removed from office via the process set up by the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment because the meaning of that Amendment allows a president to be 
removed not only because of incapacity in a narrow sense but also because 
the President is, in much broader terms, unfit for the office to which he 
was elected. 
This Article argues that, properly understood, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment is designed to allow the Executive and Legislative Branches, 
working together, to remove a president from office when it becomes evi-
dent that the person elevated to that office by the electoral process is man-
ifestly unsuited for what can, without exaggeration, be described as the 
most important job in the world. 
It argues further that the first two years of Donald Trump’s Presi-
dency have provided a great deal of evidence for the proposition that Pres-
ident Trump has, in fact, demonstrated the requisite level of fundamental 
unfitness for the office that would justify using the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment to remove him. This Article also argues that the cultural conditions 
  
 10. Caitlin Yilek, Alan Dershowitz: Rosenstein Talk of 25th Amendment, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Feb. 15, 2019, 10:50 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/alan-dershowitz-rosenstein-
talk-of-25th-amendment-showed-he-was-watching-house-of-cards-instead-of-reading-the-constitu-
tion. 
 11. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 14, 2019, 8:16 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1096246820097966080?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctw-
camp%5Etweetembed%7Ct.  
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that brought President Trump to office make it far from unlikely that other 
occasions to use the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in this way will arise in the 
foreseeable future. 
Our contemporary legal and political culture should embrace the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, suitably modified by congressional legislation, 
as an appropriately powerful tool to deal with present and future forms of 
radical legal and political dysfunction. In short, the Presidency of the 
United States is too important of a job not to allow for a process—beyond 
quadrennial elections and quasi-criminal impeachment trials—by which 
the American people can say to a president, through its elected represent-
atives: “You’re fired.” 
This Article has four parts. Part I outlines the history of the adoption 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and explains why the Amendment’s plain 
text and legislative history make it clear that Section Four of the Amend-
ment allows it to be used to remove an unfit office holder from the Presi-
dency. Part II discusses several objections to reading the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment in a way that allows a president to be removed for anything 
other than a narrowly defined concept of physical or mental incapacity. 
Part III discusses how Donald Trump’s election, and his subsequent Pres-
idency, illustrate how imperative it is to interpret the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment flexibly as the Amendment’s framers intended it to be inter-
preted. Part IV argues that the Trump Presidency should not be dismissed 
as a freakish incident in American presidential history and puts forth a 
proposal for using the constitutional mechanisms created by the Amend-
ment itself to reform the process for employing it in the future. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment both clarifies and modifies Article II, 
Section One, Clause Six of the U.S. Constitution. That clause states that 
the powers and duties of the Presidency devolve to the Vice President in 
the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of the President, 
and that “Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, 
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President.”12 
For 175 years, the American presidential system functioned with no 
legal provision for either replacing the Vice President when that office be-
came vacant or for replacing a president who was unable, either temporar-
ily or permanently, to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the 
office at a minimal level of competence.13 
Indeed, when William Henry Harrison died just a month after his in-
auguration in 1841, it was not clear if Vice President John Tyler had 
simply become the new President or was merely the acting-President for 
  
 12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 13. Lawrence J. Trautman, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Incapacity and Ability to Discharge 
the Powers and Duties of Office?, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 384–86 (2019). 
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the remainder of what would have been Harrison’s term of office.14 Tyler 
acted forcefully to claim the title of President of the United States by, 
among other things, refusing to sign documents which referred to him as 
the acting-President.15 Both houses of Congress subsequently passed res-
olutions declaring that Tyler was simply President of the United States.16 
By the time of the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the 
Vice Presidency had been vacant sixteen times, either because the Vice 
President had succeeded to the Presidency or had died or resigned prior to 
the next presidential election.17 The Amendment’s first Section formalizes 
the constitutional status of a vice president who succeeds to the Presi-
dency.18 The second Section creates a mechanism for naming a new vice 
president when that office becomes vacant.19 
The Amendment’s third Section creates a procedure that allows a 
president to transfer the powers of the office temporarily to the Vice Pres-
ident, who becomes the acting-President, until the President is ready again 
to resume those powers.20 
Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the focus of this Ar-
ticle. It reads as follows: 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal of-
ficers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Sen-
ate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written dec-
laration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers 
and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the Pres-
ident transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that 
no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office 
unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers 
of the executive department[s], or of such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their 
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, 
assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. 
If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter writ-
ten declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one 
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds 
  
 14. Id. at 386. 
 15. Callie Hopkins, John Tyler and Presidential Succession, WHITE HOUSE HIST. ASS’N (Mar. 
22, 2019), https://www.whitehousehistory.org/john-tyler-and-presidential-succession. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Trautman, supra note 13, at 385; Succession: Presidential and Vice Presidential Fast Facts, 
CNN (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/us/succession-presidential-and-vice-presi-
dential-fast-facts/. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
 19. Id. § 2. 
 20. Id. § 3. 
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vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the pow-
ers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to dis-
charge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall re-
sume the powers and duties of his office.21 
Despite claims by some prominent legal commenters that certain pro-
cedural aspects of Section Four are ambiguous, a close examination of the 
legislative record at the time of the Amendment’s adoption reveals that the 
procedure it lays out is straightforward.22 
First, “the majority of the principal officers of the executive depart-
ments” means the heads of the fifteen departments specified in 5 U.S.C. 
Section 101.23 This, in turn, specifies that if eight of these officers agree 
with the Vice President that the President is “unable to discharge the pow-
ers and duties of his office,” the Vice President becomes the acting-Presi-
dent upon transmission to the relevant congressional officers of a declara-
tion to that effect. 
Second, the Vice President remains the acting-President unless and 
until the President transmits a message declaring that no inability exists.24 
If the President does so, then the Vice President and the principal officers 
have four days to transmit a second message to Congress contesting the 
President’s assessment.25 The Vice President remains the acting-President 
during this four-day period.26 If the Vice President and the principal offic-
ers transmit this second message, then Congress must decide the matter 
within twenty-one days.27 Congress has forty-eight hours to go into session 
if it is not in session when the second transmission is made.28 The twenty-
one day period then begins once Congress goes into session.29 
Third, the legislative history reveals the reason behind including the 
option for Congress to replace Executive Department principal officers 
with another body that would, by majority vote, authorize the Vice Presi-
dent to transmit a notice of inability to Congress. The framers were con-
cerned with whether the principal officers would constitute an appropriate 
  
 21. Id. § 4. The text of the amendment contains a scrivener’s error, as the second use of “exec-
utive departments” inadvertently omitted the “s” at the end of “departments.” 
 22. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, The Chaotic Aftermath of Invoking the 25th Amendment, BOS. 
GLOBE (Sept. 11, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/09/11/the-chaotic-af-
termath-invoking-amendment/lW1Ym7ZgIYANML2BR05ipI/story.html (arguing that the Amend-
ment is ambiguous in regard to such questions as whether the Vice President retains the powers of an 
acting-President during the four-day period during which the President may contest the Vice Presi-
dent’s and the principal officers’ finding of inability). 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 89–203, at 3 (1965). 
 24. Trautman, supra note 13, at 378. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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body for the purposes of employing the Amendment.30 Those concerns 
were, as this Article argues below, well-warranted. Subsequent history has 
demonstrated the pressing need to create such a body. 
The central interpretive issue regarding Section Four is not proce-
dural; it is the substantive question of what meaning should be attributed 
to the phrase: “[U]nable to discharge the powers and duties of [the Presi-
dent’s] office.” Here, the legislative history reveals that the authors of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment chose that phrase to give great discretion to 
both the officers of the Executive Branch and Congress—who made the 
initial and final determination of presidential inability, respectively—to 
define that term in whatever way they believed specific circumstances 
warranted.31 
This decision is reflected in the language of Section Four itself, which 
does not limit what can be considered presidential inability.32 That open-
ended language is no accident; it reflects a conscious decision on the part 
of the Amendment’s framers to leave the determination of what should 
constitute grounds for invoking Section Four in the hands of future politi-
cal actors.33 
Indeed, the level of discretion at the time was noted by legislators 
concerned that Section Four gave those permitted to employ the process 
near-complete authorization to remove a president. For example, Edward 
Hutchinson, the Republican representative who, a few years later, would 
be his party’s ranking member on the House Judiciary Committee that sub-
mitted articles of impeachment against President Nixon, objected to the 
language. Hutchinson objected on the grounds that Section Four’s failure 
to define inability could leave the Vice President and the principal officers 
with “complete power to treat any condition or circumstance they choose 
as a disability.”34  
Yet the Amendment’s principal drafter, John Feerick, argues the con-
trary. He points to the same semantic open-endedness to emphasize that 
the framers elected not to define what might constitute presidential inabil-
ity that would warrant the Amendment’s use. Feerick has emphasized that 
“[n]o set of definitions could possibly deal with every contingency.”35 At-
tempting to define inability in the Amendment itself would, he has argued, 
make it more difficult to actually use the Amendment as it was intended 
to be used. Such an attempt would lead inevitably to debates about whether 
a particular use of the Amendment was authorized by its terms. By leaving 
  
 30. 111 CONG. REC. 3283 (1965); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice 
President: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 88th Cong. 136–37 (1964); see also id. at 92. (statement of Lewis J. Powell). 
 31. See John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 481, 493–98 (1995). 
 32. Id. at 502. 
 33. Id. 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 89–203, at 20 (1965). 
 35. Feerick, supra note 31, at 502. 
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the concept undefined, the framers intended to “allow[] for flexibility and 
discretion.”36 
In short, the meaning of “unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of [the President’s] office” is supposed to be determined, according to the 
Amendment’s own terms, by those who have occasion to use it, and not 
by the Amendment itself. Instead, it creates a process for giving that phrase 
a more concrete meaning within the context in which the political actors 
who are considering invoking it find themselves. The plain language of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the legislative history surrounding its en-
actment, and subsequent scholarly analysis lead to the conclusion that the 
Amendment covers “any imaginable circumstance[]” where the President 
“is unable to perform the powers and duties of that office.”37 
A recent, comprehensive scholarly examination of the history of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s creation and adoption comments on the inter-
pretation of presidential ability: 
[T]hose deciding whether a President is “unable to discharge the pow-
ers and duties of his office” should focus on the overall effects of the 
inability—whether the totality of the circumstances suggests that ina-
bility prevents him from discharging the powers and duties of the Pres-
idency—rather than the specific characteristics of the inability itself.38 
Both the plain language of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the in-
tention of those who drafted that language reveal that the Amendment’s 
purpose is to create a mechanism to deal with presidential inability in any 
form, rather than to define what specifically forms presidential inability 
might take.39 
A president who is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the 
office is, by definition, unfit to hold the office. By its terms, the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment creates a process for removing a president whose unfit-
ness for office is sufficiently severe enough that it renders the President, 
as a practical matter, unable to discharge the powers and duties of the of-
fice at a minimally acceptable level of competence.40 And, there is nothing 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Fifty Years 
After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential Succession Sys-
tem, 86 FORDHAM L. Rev. 917, 928 (2017) (quoting KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, 
HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 209–10 (1988)). 
 38. YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE 20 (2018). 
 39. A discussion of the various modalities of constitutional interpretation in American law is 
far beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the most widely recognized sources of con-
stitutional meaning—text, structure, original public understanding, and the best understanding of the 
evolving meaning of the document—all point to the same conclusion: that the interpretation of the 
applicability of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to future presidential crises of inability has been left 
intentionally to those political actors who will face those crises at the times they arise. 
 40. While it is true that all presidents who are unable to discharge the powers and duties of the 
office are, while the inability persists, unfit for office, it does not follow that all presidents who are 
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in either the text or the legislative history of the Amendment that limits 
such unfitness to that which has been caused by some acute physical or 
mental crisis or illness that strikes the President after taking office. Indeed, 
it is perfectly possible that the electoral process may elevate a radically 
unfit candidate—someone who is unable to discharge the powers and the 
duties of the office at a minimally acceptable level—to the Presidency it-
self. In such a circumstance, there is no legal barrier to using the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to remove such a radically unfit president from office, 
nor should there be: 
[T]here is no support for the idea that the framers designed the Amend-
ment only “to protect the government from random occurrences like 
sudden illness or a failed assassination attempt” or that a [p]resident 
“who already demonstrated [disabling] traits when the peo-
ple . . . elected him to office” would somehow be immunized from the 
Amendment’s operation.41 
Furthermore, while Section Four has yet to be employed, and there 
are, therefore, no judicial precedents regarding its interpretation. The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the impeachment process make it 
abundantly clear that the substantive question of what should constitute a 
presidential inability that warrants employing the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment is a textbook example of where the Court would likely invoke the 
Political Question Doctrine.42 
Because Section Four unquestionably represents a “textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment,” the Court would almost certainly treat any attempt to challenge 
either the Vice President’s and the principal officers’ or Congress’s inter-
pretation of the meaning of “unable” under Section Four as raising a non-
justiciable political question.43 
In sum, both the plain language of Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and the intentions of the Amendment’s framers give wide dis-
cretion to the relevant political actors to determine what ought to constitute 
  
unfit for the office are unable to discharge those powers and duties within the meaning of Section 
Four. This Article takes the position that the authors of Section Four intended the question of what 
level of presidential unfitness should be sufficient to trigger its provisions to be a matter of political 
judgment. The text of the Amendment empowers political actors to make those judgments in the fu-
ture. 
 41. YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 38, at 22 n.67. 
 42. The leading case regarding the political question doctrine is Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
217–18 (1962), in which the Court stated that it will not intervene in matters that involve a “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” 
 43. Id.; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226–28 (1993). On the other hand, Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe points out that “just because a constitutional line is non-justiciable doesn’t mean 
it’s non-existent.” Professor Tribe asserts that “there is a wide gap (with blurry boundaries) between 
an unacceptably narrow definition of unfitness, e.g., a definition regarding a sudden or random crisis 
like kidnapping or a stroke, and a definition as completely unbounded and open-ended as one based 
on notion of minimal presidential competence. Private correspondence with Professor Laurence Tribe 
(on file with the author). 
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presidential inability and unfitness in any particular social context. Conse-
quently, it is almost certain that the federal courts will not review the sub-
stantive decisions that those actors make as to that question. 
While it is true that the Amendment’s framers were particularly con-
cerned with situations in which the need to use Section Four would be so 
obvious that the Amendment’s use would be uncontroversial—such as, for 
example, if the President fell into a coma or were kidnapped44—it is also 
true that they envisioned a wide range of controversial uses of Section 
Four.45 This is reflected most obviously in the fact that they set up an elab-
orate process for resolving disputes within the government. The framers 
were farsighted enough to recognize that they could not envision all the 
possible scenarios of presidential incapacity or unfitness for which the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment would be required.46 
It does not follow that all of the Amendment’s framers, and the leg-
islators who ratified it, would have approved of using the Amendment to 
transfer the powers of the Office of the President to the Vice President 
because of a judgment that the President had demonstrated a radical unfit-
ness for the office by consistently failing to maintain a minimum level of 
competence. That is, by its nature, a politically controversial act, and some 
of them would no doubt have opposed, at least in the abstract, using the 
Amendment in this way.47 But the key point is that they intentionally chose 
to draft the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in such a way that the Amendment’s 
text leaves it for future political actors to decide for themselves if the 
Amendment should be used in this fashion. 
None of which is to deny the possibility that Section Four could be 
interpreted in ways that everyone would agree violated the Amendment’s 
plain text. It is universally acknowledged that it would be a misinterpreta-
tion of Section Four to use it to remove a president simply because of a 
policy dispute or because of a vice president’s self-interested desire to re-
place his bureaucratic superior. Still, it is worth noting that such extremely 
improbable abuses of the Amendment would still be treated by the federal 
courts as raising nonjusticiable questions. Thus, the remedy for any such 
abuse would have to come at the ballot box.48 
But, the mere fact that a power can be abused does not mean the 
power does not exist. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives other political 
actors an essentially unreviewable legal power to remove the President of 
the United States from office should they conclude that the President is 
  
 44. YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 38, at 21–24. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; Feerick, supra note 31, at 502. 
 47. Whether these authors of the text would have continued to hold this position if they had 
been confronted with a sufficiently unfit president is a different question, and a counterfactual that 
goes to the heart of arguments about how to use original textual meaning in legal interpretation. 
 48. See generally Private Correspondence with Professor Laurence Tribe, supra note 43. To 
repeat Professor Tribe’s point, the fact that an abuse of the Constitution does not produce a justiciable 
issue does not transform that abuse into a valid use of the powers granted by the document. 
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either temporarily or permanently unable to discharge the powers and du-
ties of the office at a minimally acceptable level of competence. 
Of course, the fact that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, according to 
both its plain language and the intentions of its framers, creates a broad 
constitutional power to declare a sitting president unfit for the office does 
not tell us whether this power should be employed in any particular cir-
cumstance. As its framers recognized, whether or not Section Four’s pow-
ers should be used is always going to be a highly contextual and prudential 
decision. The next Part of this Article begins to explore when it would be 
appropriate to use the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to remove an unfit presi-
dent, by considering various objections to reading Section Four in any-
thing but the narrowest sense. 
II. OBJECTIONS TO USING THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Objections to using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to remove an unfit 
president include: 
(A) That interpreting “unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
[the President’s] office” more broadly than in the phrase’s most 
literal sense creates the possibility that a president will be re-
moved for partisan rather than principled reasons. 
(B) That removing a president via Section Four would represent an 
undemocratic reversal of the electoral process. 
(C) That the Impeachment Clause is the sole, appropriate mechanism 
for removing an unfit president. 
Let us consider these objections in turn. 
A. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Political Partisanship 
Some commenters argue that if the concept of presidential inability 
is interpreted in any way but a narrow, essentially literal sense (such as if 
the President is in a coma) it could be abused for partisan reasons. For 
example, George Washington University law professor, Jonathan Turley, 
stated recently that, while he agrees that the Amendment’s provisions for 
establishing a transfer of power represented a desirable reform, he sees the 
language of Section Four as containing “a dangerous ambiguity.”49 In 
Turley’s view, “the framers [of the original Constitution] would have been 
leery of that type of language because it is so ambiguous. It lays the Pres-
idency open to partisan attempts at removal.” Turley added that he be-
lieved talk of using Section Four to remove President Trump was “an ex-
ample of exactly the danger created by the 25th Amendment.”50  
  
 49. Deena Zaru, Constitutional Scholars: 25th Amendment Talk ‘Premature,’ Unrealistic, CNN 
(July 4, 2017, 12:34 AM) https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/03/politics/what-is-the-25th-amendment-
donald-trump/index.html. 
 50. Id. 
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The problem with this argument is that—like all slippery-slope argu-
ments—it can be applied to any legal rule whose application is in any sense 
indeterminate. For instance, it is equally applicable to the Impeachment 
Clause, which authorizes Congress to remove a president for committing 
“high crimes and misdemeanors.”51 This phrase is also ambiguous and 
could certainly be abused for partisan reasons. Yet, citing that interpretive 
fact does not, by itself, constitute an argument for reading the Impeach-
ment Clause in an especially narrow way.52 
Furthermore, all slippery-slope arguments suffer from the pragmatic 
weakness that they can almost always be reversed. For example, reading 
Section Four in a narrow way makes it more likely that a radically unfit 
person will continue to hold the Presidency for years—while doing im-
mense damage to the nation. In other words, when considering whether to 
read Section Four narrowly or broadly, the slippery slope runs in both di-
rections.53 
Setting aside the pragmatic indeterminacy of slippery-slope argu-
ments, the structure of Section Four makes no sense if we were to treat 
broad interpretations of presidential inability as per se illegitimate. The 
very fact that Section Four includes a procedure for resolving arguments 
about what degree of presidential inability is sufficient to justify transfer-
ring the President’s powers to the Vice President demonstrates that the 
Amendment was never intended to be limited to uncontroversial applica-
tions of the concept of inability.54 
In other words, a judgment of inability under Section Four can legit-
imately include a broader qualitative—and, therefore, potentially contro-
versial—assessment of presidential ability, as opposed to being limited to 
relatively literal, uncontroversial applications. For example, consider the 
question of whether the Author of this Article has the ability to play Major 
League Baseball. If taken literally, the answer to this question is certainly 
“yes,” in that the Author has played baseball on many occasions and could, 
no doubt, participate in Major League Baseball games. Yet, the Author is 
completely incapable of playing Major League Baseball, if the judgment 
of his ability to do so includes any sort of qualitative judgment regarding 
his ability to do so at a minimally acceptable level. For the purposes of 
interpreting Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, “ability” must 
mean “ability to discharge the powers and duties of the office at a mini-
mally acceptable level of competence.” A more literal reading of Section 
Four makes no sense, given both the Amendment’s overall structure, and 
its practical purpose. 
  
 51. U.S. CONST. art II, § 4. 
 52. On slippery slope arguments in law generally, see Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the 
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1065–66 (2003). 
 53. Alan Hajek, Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Methodology, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY 358, 360 (Herman Cappelein et al. eds., 2016). 
 54. See Private Correspondence with Professor Laurence Tribe, supra note 43. 
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In addition, the Amendment’s structure makes partisan abuse highly 
unlikely to be realized. In its current form, Section Four can only be put 
into effect if the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers 
agree to do so. All, or almost all, of these persons will be members of the 
same political party as the President, and are, therefore, almost certain to 
be at least broadly sympathetic to the President’s overall political orienta-
tion.55 And, even if Congress were to create an alternative body to aid the 
Vice President in performing this function, as Section Four authorizes it 
to do, the composition of such an alternative body would surely take into 
account concerns about potential partisan abuse of the Section Four pro-
cess. 
Beyond all this, replacing the President for a level of inability that 
makes the President unfit for office is something that might draw more 
support from within the President’s own party, or even from inside his own 
administration, rather than from political opponents.56 For example, many 
progressives have commented that the only good thing they have to say 
about President Trump is that his general unfitness for the Office of the 
Presidency makes him far less effective at advancing his party’s agenda.57 
In such instances, partisan opposition to the President may well, as a prac-
tical matter, cut against invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
B. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Democratic Values 
Another objection to potentially using Section Four to remove a pres-
ident from office is that doing so would obviate the results of the demo-
cratic process by canceling the outcome of a presidential election. This 
objection warrants several responses. 
First, the American system of constitutional governance was inten-
tionally designed to be full of undemocratic features. These include, 
among other things, the makeup of the Senate; selection of federal judges 
and their employment of life tenure; the numerous procedural barriers to 
passing even quite populat legislations; and, most notably in this context, 
the role of the electoral college in the election of presidents.58 
President Trump, after all, fell nearly three million votes short of re-
ceiving a plurality—let alone a majority of votes—cast in the election that 
  
 55. As of September 4, 2019, no member of President Trump’s current cabinet was member of 
the Democratic party. See The Cabinet, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-ad-
ministration/the-cabinet/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). 
 56. See, e.g., I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
5, 2018, 5:58 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-re-
sistance.html (an essay published by an anonymous senior official in the Trump Administration). 
 57. For example, Harvard political science professor, Steven Levitsky, co-author of HOW 
DEMOCRACIES DIE, commented recently that “Trump’s incompetence is a good thing for democracy. 
He has authoritarian inclinations, but he hasn’t been able to put them into practice.” Doyle McManus, 
The Good News: Trump’s Ineptitude, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-mcmanus-column-20190111-story.html. 
 58. Jeffrey Rosen, America is Living James Madison’s Nightmare, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/james-madison-mob-rule/568351/. 
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elevated him to the Presidency. Indeed, this was the second time in the last 
five presidential elections that the winning candidate received less votes 
than the candidate from the other major party.59 
In short, the existing system for electing presidents in the United 
States is hardly an advertisement for anything resembling pure democracy, 
even without taking into account the potential use of Section Four of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Furthermore, using Section Four to elevate the Vice President to the 
role of acting-President does not come close to reversing the results of an 
election. Rather, it modifies those results in a way that still leaves the party 
that won the presidential election in control of the office. Voters choose 
the President with the knowledge that they are also voting for the Presi-
dent’s selection of a running mate, who may become President under var-
ious circumstances.60 In this way, replacing a president via Section Four is 
considerably less undemocratic than the Electoral College (the institution 
that was originally intended as a bulwark against demagoguery and incom-
petence), which makes it possible for a candidate to lose the national pop-
ular vote, yet still become President. In addition, removing a president via 
Section Four is itself an exercise in representative democracy, as doing so 
requires super majorities in both houses of Congress. 
Ultimately, Section Four reflects a judgment found throughout the 
American constitutional system that, while direct democracy is a core 
value of that system, it should sometimes give way to other important val-
ues.61 The elevation of someone who the system decides subsequently is 
unfit for the office is one of those occasions, and the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment was created for precisely that reason. 
Besides its purely practical function, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
plays an important role in recalibrating the delicate balance of power in 
the American system of government. As the political scientist, Juan Linz, 
noted in his highly influential work on what he called “the perils of presi-
dentialism,” presidential systems based on the model created by the U.S. 
Constitution suffer from a potentially debilitating weakness: the problem 
of dual-democratic legitimacy, whereby both the Legislative and the Ex-
ecutive Branches can claim to plausibly represent the “will of the peo-
ple.”62 
Properly understood, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should work as 
an important ameliorative force against the threat of an imperial Presi-
dency, because it gives the Legislative Branch the right to remove the chief 
executive for reasons that go well beyond the relatively narrow grounds 
  
 59. George W. Bush received less votes than Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election. 
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 61. Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 294–96 
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that constitute what are currently considered legitimate reasons to remove 
a president under the Impeachment Clause.63 
In this sense, Section Four is not so much antidemocratic, as it is a 
rebalancing of democratic legitimacy between the Legislature and the 
President; a balancing act that, as Linz emphasizes, must always be per-
formed in presidential systems based on the American model.64 
C. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment as a Substitute for Impeachment 
The argument is sometimes made that Section Four of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment should not be a substitute for the process of impeaching 
and removing a president. In this light, Section Four should be read nar-
rowly to encompass only noncontroversial instances of disability, while 
more controversial forms of presidential unfitness should be dealt with via 
the impeachment process.65 
This argument fails to acknowledge that the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment, both by its plain language and the intention of its framers, is clearly 
supposed to cover instances of presidential unfitness that do not fit into the 
broad definition of “treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misde-
meanors.”66 
While it is true that as a matter of eighteenth-century English practice, 
the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,” could include various non-
criminal forms of official negligence and dereliction of duty. By the time 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was enacted it was clear that the historical 
practice in America was to limit the use of the impeachment process to at 
least quasi-criminal matters that fell under the rubric of serious official 
corruption.67 
Impeachment, in practice, has become something intended solely to 
remove a corrupt president, rather than a president fundamentally unfit to 
hold office or for other reasons. An impeachment proceeding in the House, 
and especially a subsequent trial in the Senate, are parts of what the public 
understandably considers something akin to a criminal proceeding.68 The 
idea of using impeachment to remove a president who is merely grossly 
unfit for office seems as counterintuitive as convicting someone of a crime 
for merely being terrible at their job. 
  
 63. Id. at 52–53. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 66. See supra Part I. 
 67. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY (2018). 
 68. See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98–806, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, at 5 (2005). 
2019] AGE OF DEMAGOGUES 101 
Given the historical context of the American presidential system, im-
peachment is also a process that is considered the epitome of partisan po-
litical conflict.69 By sharp contrast, while Section Four has yet to be for-
mally put to use, the occasions on which the possibility of using it has been 
raised informally have been marked by a fundamentally different political 
dynamic. In these instances, powerful members of a President Reagan’s 
own Administration have considered invoking Section Four to deal with 
the President’s perceived inability to do a minimally adequate job, while 
still holding the most important office in the government.70 
This is exactly what the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in-
tended.71 It is almost impossible to imagine members of a president’s own 
administration working to impeach them, given what is, in the context of 
American political history, the fundamentally partisan nature of the im-
peachment process. But, it is not only possible to imagine key members of 
a presidential administration considering whether to try to use the Consti-
tution to remove an arguably unfit president via Section Four; we already 
have several examples of this happening. And, for reasons that will be dis-
cussed below, we are likely to see more such incidents in the future. 
Furthermore, Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has a 
feature which makes it, under certain circumstances, vastly superior to im-
peachment as a method for removing an unfit president from office. Sec-
tion Four, when invoked, immediately transfers all the powers of the pres-
idential office to the Vice President at the moment the message of transfer 
is transmitted to the relevant congressional officers.72 The impeachment 
process, by contrast, leaves the President in full command of all of the 
powers of the office during the time—which could easily stretch out for 
months—when an impeachment action is working its way through the 
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House and Senate.73 If a president is engaging in ongoing, flagrant abuse 
of the office—by, for example, refusing to step down after losing an elec-
tion—the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides a far more practical remedy 
to such a (currently, all too easy to envision)74 constitutional crisis. 
In sum, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides a crucial alternative 
to the impeachment process. A process that allows the American political 
system to remove a fundamentally unfit person from the Oval Office 
through a mechanism other than a quadrennial election on the one hand or 
a quasi-criminal trial on the other. Given that, as is now becoming increas-
ingly evident, the electoral process can lead to the elevation of someone to 
the Presidency who should be removed for compelling reasons that have 
nothing to do with—or more precisely, should be considered inde-
pendently of—criminality and corruption per se, the foresight of the fram-
ers of Section Four is something that should be recognized and embraced; 
rather than cabined in by unhistorical interpretations of their work. 
The next Part of this Article explores how using Section Four of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to remove an unfit president has, in the last two 
years, been transformed from an esoteric question of constitutional law 
theory into a pressing, practical concern for the American political system. 
III. MODERN, PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 
When Donald Trump announced in June of 2015 that he was running 
for the Republican nomination for President, many people dismissed the 
event as nothing more than a publicity stunt.75 For several months after-
ward, much political commentary continued to treat Trump’s campaign as 
a kind of joke.76 Trump, after all, was by all traditional criteria grotesquely 
unqualified to become President of the United States.77 Nearly seventy 
years old, he had never run for public office, let alone held an elected po-
sition.78 Beyond this, he had never engaged in public service of any kind—
something that could not be said of any previous president in the nation’s 
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history.79 Even the claim that Trump was qualified for the office because 
he was a successful businessman—leaving aside that this standing alone 
is a remarkably weak justification for making someone President of the 
United States—was, at best, highly questionable.80  
In the summer of 2015, Donald Trump was merely a reality-televi-
sion star whose checkered business career included a long string of bank-
ruptcies, as well as various dubious ventures, which bore strong resem-
blances to outright scams.81 He had evinced no interest in, let alone deep 
knowledge of, almost any public policy matter.82 In fact, Trump’s contri-
bution to national political debate has been limited to becoming the most 
famous proponent of a preposterous and self-evidently racist conspiracy 
theory: that Barack Obama was not born in the United States and was, 
therefore, constitutionally ineligible to serve as President.83 
The idea that this unfit figure—a 1980s celebrity, who revived his 
flagging career by staring in a reality television show—could become 
President thanks to his status as a minor-television star. Trump used his 
status to publicize his demagogic appeals to the Republican Party’s in-
creasingly ethnonationalist base—something most political commentators 
refused to take seriously.84 
The Author of this Article was not among them. The following was 
written in the weeks immediately after Trump’s announcement: 
Ronald Reagan was consistently and radically underestimated as a po-
tential political force by the national media, public intellectuals, DC 
insiders, etc., until practically up to the moment he was on the edge of 
winning the GOP nomination in 1976. [A poll showing Trump leading 
in the race for the nomination] makes me at least begin to wonder if 
something similar might not be happening with Donald Trump. Now 
obviously there are enormous differences between the backgrounds, 
the careers, and the personalities of the two men, but there are also 
some striking similarities: 
(1) Both mastered the art of manipulating their contemporary me-
dia environments. 
  
 79. The four Presidents before Trump who had never previously held elective office included 
three famous generals—Zachary Taylor, Ulysses Grant, and Dwight Eisenhower—as well as Herbert 
Hoover, who had a very extensive record of government service by the time he was elected to the 
office. Id. 
 80. Russ Buettner, Susanne Craig & David Barstow, 11 Takeaways From the Times’s Investi-
gation into Trump’s Wealth, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/us/pol-
itics/donald-trump-wealth-fred-trump.html. 
 81. See John Cassidy, Trump University: It’s Worse Than You Think, NEW YORKER (June 2, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/trump-university-its-worse-than-you-think. 
 82. See David A. Graham, The Education of Donald J. Trump, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/the-education-of-donald-j-trump/522900/. 
 83. Ashley Parker & Steve Eder, Inside the Six Weeks Donald Trump Was a Non-Stop ‘Birther’, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/us/politics/donald-trump-birther-
obama.html. 
 84. See Kenton, supra note 76. 
104 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
(2) Both manifested a fine understanding of how to make outra-
geous statements in a way that ingratiated them with their political 
bases, precisely because the national media reaction to those state-
ments allowed them to pose as victims of supposed media and/or 
elite bias. 
(3) Both spent a good part of their lives as at least putatively 
wishy-washy Democrats, before discovering that selling racial dem-
agoguery to the contemporary Republican party base was about as 
hard as selling beer at a baseball game on a 90-degree day. 
(4) Both spent most of their careers being dismissed as clownish 
lightweights. 
In a GOP presidential field that isn’t exactly stacked with political tal-
ent, the notion that Trump can’t win the nomination is at least prema-
ture. As is the idea that he can’t be elected [P]resident.85  
A few weeks later, the same Author observed: 
Trump’s campaign started as a publicity stunt, but has since spun out 
of control. It’s the plot of The Producers, but increasingly, the joke’s 
on the GOP. And, now that Trump’s bottomless narcissism is being 
fed by the spectacle of his transformation into a “serious” candidate, 
it’s hard to predict where all this will ultimately end up.86 
While Ronald Reagan was in some ways an important precursor to 
Donald Trump, it is also important to emphasize that, in terms of actual 
qualifications for the office, the two men were in no way comparable. 
Reagan was the two-term governor of the nation’s largest state, and he had 
been deeply involved in every aspect of national Republican Party politics 
for more than two decades by the time he won the party’s nomination.87  
Reagan, in other words, was a professional politician who more or 
less subtly employed racially coded messages to pander to an increasingly 
ethnonationalist Republican Party base. By contrast, Donald Trump is a 
classic demagogue, who was completely unconnected from formal Amer-
ican political life in any way prior to his sudden takeover of the Republican 
Party. He employs openly racist messages to gain the favor of the white 
ethnonationalists and their fellow travelers at the core of the contemporary 
American conservative movement.88 
Coincidentally, Reagan is the only President prior to Donald Trump 
whose behavior led members of his own Administration to contemplate 
  
 85. Paul Campos, It Can’t Happen Here, Until It Does, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY (July 9, 
2015, 4:09 PM), www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2015/07/it-cant-happen-here-until-it-does. 
 86. Paul Campos, Springtime For Donald, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY (Aug. 30, 2015, 7:08 
PM), www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2015/08/springtime-for-donald. 
 87. RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE 408–19 (2015). 
 88. See David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive List, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/leonhardt-
trump-racist.html. 
2019] AGE OF DEMAGOGUES 105 
whether invoking Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might be 
warranted. However, in his case, the elderly President was showing signs 
of mental deterioration toward the end of his second term and would be 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease not long afterwards. Another funda-
mental distinction is that, at the time he was elected few, if any, prominent 
commentators ever suggested that Reagan was fundamentally unfit for of-
fice—no matter how bitterly various critics may have opposed his political 
agenda.89 
The same cannot be said of Donald Trump. In the weeks after Presi-
dent Trump’s inauguration, the nation was treated to the mordant spectacle 
of various elite political and media figures seeking frantically for signs that 
somehow the Office of the Presidency would, by some essentially magical 
political alchemy, transform the President into a fundamentally different 
person—one who possessed the minimum fitness to hold the most im-
portant political office in the world. 
For example, in March of 2017, Trump honored the widow of a Navy 
SEAL during an address to a joint session of Congress.90 Commenting on 
what was, in fact, a completely routine piece of political theater, CNN’s 
Van Jones stated that Trump “became President of the United States in 
that moment, period. That was one of the most extraordinary moments you 
have ever seen in American politics," Jones said that same evening.91 
A month later, after Trump ordered a missile strike on targets in 
Syria, Jones’s colleague, Fareed Zakaria, opined: 
I think Donald Trump became [P]resident of the United States last 
night. I think this was actually a big moment. For the first time really 
as [P]resident, he talked about international norms, international rules, 
about America’s role in enforcing justice in the world.92 
In fact, the desperate search for “the moment when Donald Trump 
became [P]resident,” soon became so absurdly futile that the phrase was 
quickly transformed into a sarcastic punchline among critics of the Ad-
ministration.93 
Indeed, Donald Trump’s evident unfitness to hold the office was so 
flagrant that, just four months into his Presidency, a prominent conserva-
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tive political commentators used the nation’s highest-profile opinion edi-
torial newspaper page to advocate for removing President Trump from of-
fice via Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: 
[A child] cannot have the nuclear codes. 
But a child also cannot really commit ''high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
in any usual meaning of the term. There will be more talk of impeach-
ment now, more talk of a special prosecutor for the Russia business; 
well and good. But ultimately I do not believe that our [P]resident suf-
ficiently understands the nature of the office that he holds, the nature 
of the legal constraints that are supposed to bind him, perhaps even the 
nature of normal human interactions, to be guilty of obstruction of jus-
tice in the Nixonian or even Clintonian sense of the phrase. I do not 
believe he is really capable of the behind-the-scenes conspiring that 
the darker Russia theories envision. And it is hard to betray an oath of 
office whose obligations you evince no sign of really understanding or 
respecting. 
Which is not an argument for allowing him to occupy that office. It is 
an argument, instead, for using a constitutional mechanism more ap-
propriate to this strange situation than impeachment: the 25th Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which allows for the removal of the president 
if a majority of the cabinet informs the Congress that he is ''unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office'' and (should the president 
contest his own removal) a two–thirds vote by Congress confirms the 
cabinet's judgment. 
The Trump situation is not exactly the sort that the [A]mendment's 
Cold War-era designers were envisioning. He has not endured an as-
sassination attempt or suffered a stroke or fallen prey to Alzheimer's. 
But his incapacity to really govern, to truly execute the serious duties 
that fall to him to carry out, is nevertheless testified to daily—not by 
his enemies or external critics, but by precisely the men and women 
whom the Constitution asks to stand in judgment on him, the men and 
women who serve around him in the White House and the cabinet. 
Read the things that these people, members of his inner circle, his per-
sonally selected appointees, say daily through anonymous quotations 
to the press. (And I assure you they say worse off the record.) They 
have no respect for him, indeed they seem to palpate with contempt 
for him, and to regard their mission as equivalent to being stewards for 
a syphilitic emperor. 
It is not squishy New York Times conservatives who regard the [P]res-
ident as a child, an intellectual void, a hopeless case, a threat to na-
tional security; it is people who are self-selected loyalists, who sup-
ported him in the campaign, who daily go to work for him. And all 
this, in the fourth month of his administration. 
This will not get better. It could easily get worse. And as hard and 
controversial as a 25th Amendment remedy would be, there are ways 
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in which Trump's removal today should be less painful for conserva-
tives than abandoning him in the campaign would have been -- since 
Hillary Clinton will not be retroactively elected if Trump is removed, 
nor will Neil Gorsuch be unseated. Any cost to Republicans will be 
counted in internal divisions and future primary challenges, not in im-
mediate policy defeats. 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the Republican leadership's duty 
to their country, and indeed to the world that our imperium bestrides, 
leaving a man this witless and unmastered in an office with these pow-
ers and responsibilities is an act of gross negligence, which no objec-
tive on the near-term political horizon seems remotely significant 
enough to justify.94 
What is most striking about the views Ross Douthat expressed in May 
of 2017 is the copious evidence that continues to be shared so widely—
and not merely among President Trump’s ideological opponents. But this 
view is also shared among the conservative intelligentsia, in general, and 
Republican party elites, in particular.95 Most remarkably, as Douthat sug-
gested, these same views are apparently still commonplace among various 
high-ranking officials within the Trump Administration itself.96 
For example, in September of 2018, the New York Times took the 
extraordinary step of publishing an anonymous article from a senior offi-
cial in the Trump Administration that, among other things, discussed both 
the President’s erratic behavior, and cabinet-level conversations about po-
tentially employing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: 
From the White House to executive branch departments and agencies, 
senior officials will privately admit their daily disbelief at the com-
mander in chief’s comments and actions. Most are working to insulate 
their operations from his whims. 
Meetings with him veer off topic and off the rails, he engages in repet-
itive rants, and his impulsiveness results in half-baked, ill-informed 
and occasionally reckless decisions that have to be walked back. 
“There is literally no telling whether he might change his mind from 
one minute to the next,” a top official complained to me recently, ex-
asperated by an Oval Office meeting at which the [P]resident flip-
flopped on a major policy decision he’d made only a week earlier . . .  
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Given the instability many witnessed, there were early whispers within 
the cabinet of invoking the 25th Amendment, which would start a com-
plex process for removing the [P]resident. But no one wanted to precip-
itate a constitutional crisis. So we will do what we can to steer the ad-
ministration in the right direction until—one way or another—it’s 
over.97 
The most startling evidence of willingness of high officials in the 
Trump Administration to consider invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
has been provided by former-Deputy Director of the FBI, Andrew 
McCabe. According to McCabe, in the tumultuous days immediately after 
President Trump fired FBI Director James Comey, top officials at both the 
FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) considered how to move for-
ward.98 The President had fired Comey after asking him to drop an inves-
tigation into National Security Advisor Michael Flynn’s statements to in-
vestigators about Russia.99 Amazingly, President Trump stated in an inter-
view with NBC News that his concerns about the Russia probe were part 
of the reason he had fired Comey.100 This admission would seem to be a 
textbook example of an admission on the President’s own part that he ob-
structed justice. 
At this point, McCabe had every reason to fear that President Trump 
was engaging in a coverup of his Administration’s dealings with Russia. 
McCabe, therefore, started two investigations into obstruction of justice, 
and whether Trump himself was personally compromised by Russia.101 To 
this point, the FBI’s investigation of the Administration’s Russia connec-
tion had been focused on various advisors to the Trump campaign, rather 
than on the President himself.102 
At about the same time, McCabe met with Deputy Attorney General, 
Rod Rosenstein, who was overseeing the DOJ’s Russia investigation, be-
cause Attorney General Jeff Sessions had recused himself from doing so. 
According to McCabe, Rosenstein suggested that he could surreptitiously 
wear a recording device (a wire) when meeting with the President, because 
he was not searched when he went to the White House. The point of this, 
apparently, would be to gather evidence for the probes into President 
  
 97. See I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, supra note 56. 
 98. Byron Tau, Sadie Gurman & Aruna Viswanatha, Ex-FBI Official McCabe Says He Ap-
proved Trump Probe After James Comey Firing, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/ex-fbi-
deputy-mccabe-says-he-approved-trump-probe-after-james-comey-was-fired-
11550162396?ns=prod/accounts-wsj (last updated Feb. 14, 2019, 7:55 PM). 
 99. McCabe tells his version of this story in ANDREW MCCABE, THE THREAT: HOW THE FBI 
PROTECTS AMERICA IN THE AGE OF TERROR AND TRUMP 7–11 (2019). 
 100. Ali Vitali & Corky Siemaszko, Trump Interview with Lester Holt: President Asked Comey 
If He Was Under Investigation, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2017, 10:59 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-reveals-he-asked-comey-whether-he-was-under-in-
vestigation-n757821. 
 101. Tau, Gurman & Viswanatha, supra note 98. 
 102. MCCABE, supra note 99, at 20–22. 
2019] AGE OF DEMAGOGUES 109 
Trump’s Russia connections, and the potential obstruction of justice when 
he fired James Comey.103 
According to McCabe—who memorialized these conversations at the 
time—Rosenstein also brought up the possibility of using Section Four of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to transfer Trump’s presidential powers to 
Vice President Mike Pence. As McCabe told the news program 60 Minutes 
in February of 2019: 
Discussion of the 25th Amendment was simply, Rod raised the issue 
and discussed it with me in the context of thinking about how many 
other cabinet officials might support such an effort. I didn’t have much 
to contribute, to be perfectly honest, in that – conversation. So I lis-
tened to what he had to say. But, to be fair, it was an unbelievably 
stressful time. I can’t even describe for you how many things must 
have been coursing through the deputy attorney general’s mind at that 
point. So it was really something he kinda threw out in a very frenzied 
chaotic conversation about where we were and what we needed to do 
next.104 
When questioned about the matter, Rosenstein did not deny that this 
conversation took place.105 
It would be comforting to assume that the election of someone as 
manifestly unfit to hold the office as President Trump is nothing but a 
freakish historical accident, and that discussions of employing the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to remove an unfit president can soon return to the realm 
of esoteric constitutional theory. Such an assumption is dangerously opti-
mistic. The Trump Presidency is revealing both the tremendous potential 
value of Section Four to the American political system and the weakness 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to deal with an unfit president—as long 
as it remains in its present form. 
Fortunately, the framers of the Amendment had enough foresight to 
include a mechanism within the Amendment to aid in dealing with future 
issues of presidential inability and unfitness—including those that the 
framers could not foresee. The final Part of this Article argues for such a 
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reform that could make the Twenty-Fifth Amendment a potentially pow-
erful tool for ameliorating the damage done to the American political sys-
tem by the election of an unfit demagogue to the Presidency.  
IV. THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AS A TOOL FOR DEFEATING 
DEMAGOGUES 
From their beginnings in ancient Athens, democratic political sys-
tems have always been vulnerable to exploitation by demagogues. A dem-
agogue is a political leader who uses rhetoric to inflame the passions and 
prejudices of the public, thereby making reasoned debate on political is-
sues difficult or impossible. According to James Fenimore Cooper’s defi-
nition, “a demagogue, in the strict signification of the word, is a ‘leader of 
the rabble’ . . . .106 The peculiar office of a demagogue is to advance his 
own interests, by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the peo-
ple.”107 Building on Cooper’s description, the political theorist, Michael 
Signer, in his recent study of demagogues, identifies four key features of 
the political type they represent. 
First, demagogues present themselves as representatives of the com-
mon people and opponents of corrupt elites.108 Second, they cultivate a 
visceral, even cult-like connection with their followers that allows them to 
develop particularly intense devotion among their supporters.109 Third, 
they exploit this connection to advance and enrich their own careers.110 
Fourth, they display contempt for ordinary rules of social conduct, and 
ultimately for the law itself.111 
The perpetual possibility that democracies will come to be dominated 
by demagogues is one reason why, historically speaking, democratic sys-
tems have been at serious risk of devolving into tyrannies. Indeed, more 
than two thousand years ago Aristotle noted in his treatise, The Politics, 
that “revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance 
of demagogues.”112 
It is fair to say that the founders of the American constitutional sys-
tem were obsessed with the possibility that the legal order they were at-
tempting to create would be undermined by demagogues.113 The Federal-
ist Papers begin and end with warnings from Alexander Hamilton about 
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the threat they pose.114 Many of the founders, and in particular Hamilton 
and James Madison, were familiar with classical political theorists such as 
Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, whose works are filled with dark warnings 
about how democracy is so easily corrupted by self-interested wielders of 
powerful demagogic rhetoric. For example, Madison wrote: “Had every 
Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still 
have been a mob.”115 
Fears of democracy being corrupted by demagoguery led the found-
ers to construct a system full of features designed to combat the exploita-
tion of majoritarian passions by insidious rhetoricians.116 For example, the 
separation of powers would help guard against the leader of any one 
branch of the government claiming that it, and he or she, alone, represented 
the will of the people.117 While the House would be a democratic body—
in the very limited sense of the term current at the time—the Senate would 
be an elite institution, full of natural aristocrats chosen by state legislators, 
rather than elected directly by the people. More crucial still was the role 
the founders envisioned for the Electoral College, which would help en-
sure that the unruly passions of the people did not result in the elevation 
of an unfit demagogue to the head of the Executive Branch.118  
Federalism, too, would limit the threat of demagogic capture of the 
government, by distributing political power across federal, state, and local 
governments, rather than concentrating it in the hands of a potentially im-
perious president.119 
These features were designed in an attempt to deal with the paradox 
at the heart of democratic governance: that, if they were manipulated by a 
sufficiently talented demagogue, the people could choose to abjure self-
rule, by handing political power over to an aspiring tyrant.120 
Perhaps not surprisingly, after more than two centuries of American 
constitutional history, very little of the founders’ original vision remains 
in place. The deliberative function of the Electoral College soon became a 
legal fiction. Senators came to be chosen by direct election. Federalism 
was swamped by the imperatives of the national administrative state, and 
as a result, presidents arrogated more and more power to themselves.121  
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Most crucially, the rise of political parties, with their slow but inevi-
table transformation into ideologically coherent institutions, and the ac-
companying pressure for the parties themselves to function according to 
democratic norms—by, for example, choosing their presidential candi-
dates via primaries—was a development the founders failed to foresee. 
Nor could they have foreseen the rise of modern information technology, 
which makes it possible for an aspiring or successful demagogue to reach 
tens-of-millions of voters instantaneously, at any time he chooses, with his 
latest rhetorical blandishments. In turn, this causes those voters to remain 
increasingly within their self-chosen epistemic bubbles, inside of which 
passion and prejudice flourish, and reasoned discourse is difficult to 
find.122 
Indeed, given the deterioration of America’s institutional defenses 
against demagogues, the rise of someone like Donald Trump to the Presi-
dency was almost surely inevitable. And, if anything, has come surpris-
ingly late in our political system’s history. During the 2016 presidential 
campaign, the conservative political theorist Matthew Franck put it this 
way: 
Two centuries after the founders attempted to tame executive power, 
bridle ambition, and open up a distance between presidents and the 
public, the present system has closed that gap, rewarded raw ambition, 
and unleashed executive power . . . [T]he only surprise about Donald 
Trump’s so-far-successful campaign is that it has taken four decades 
for something like it to emerge. The institutional conditions have long 
been in place, and could have been exploited by, say, Ross Perot if a 
timely opportunity to make his run inside one of the parties rather than 
outside them had presented itself. For the parties have thrust away con-
trol of their own fates with both hands, as vigorously as possible, by 
the empowerment of primary voters. 
The question is not “Why Trump now?” but rather “Why not a Trump 
before now?”123  
This, in turn, raises another question: how long will we have to wait 
before another Trump, of whatever ideological persuasion, seizes control 
of one of our major parties? Given the cultural forces and institutional fail-
ures that brought Donald Trump to power, the answer may well be: not 
long. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that future presidential demagogues 
will be as obviously unfit to hold the Presidency as Donald Trump. The 
question of what mixture of defective character and demagogic ambi-
tion—to the extent the two factors can ever be wholly separated—should 
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be sufficient to justify removing a president is one for future political lead-
ers to decide. 
To make those decisions, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in its present 
form, is a less than ideal instrument. The most obvious defect in the current 
structure of Section Four is that all the individuals who are charged with 
making the initial determination of presidential inability serve, with the 
exception of the Vice President, at the pleasure of the President and can 
be dismissed from office by him at any time.124 This, unfortunately, makes 
any attempt to remove an unfit president something that would need to be 
organized covertly. And this would give all such attempts, no matter how 
justified, the uncomfortable appearance of a kind of coup, carried out from 
within the Executive Branch.125 
Fortunately, Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment itself pro-
vides the solution to this dilemma. The framers of the Amendment wisely 
foresaw that it might be necessary to create an alternative mechanism to 
trigger a transfer of power from the President to the Vice President. Hence, 
Section Four provides that this decision can be made by “such other body 
as Congress may by law provide.”126 Congress can, via the normal legis-
lative process, replace the principal officers of the Executive Departments 
with another set of decision makers, who, with the Vice President, can by 
majority vote transfer presidential power to the Vice President, subject to 
eventual congressional confirmation or reversal.127 
In an age of presidential demagoguery, both present and potential, the 
need for such an alternative decision-making body to consider the use of 
Section Four’s initial finding of presidential inability is becoming increas-
ingly evident. What follows is a suggestion for how such a body might be 
constituted. 
First, the most crucial characteristic for such a body is that the large 
majority of its membership could not be fired by the President. Second, 
the membership should reflect a high level of both democratic and bipar-
tisan legitimacy. Third, its membership should include some direct input 
from the Executive Branch from someone other than the Vice President, 
because those within that branch will be in the best position to witness 
first-hand evidence of presidential inability and unfitness. Fourth, the 
membership should not be too large, so as to minimize problems of bu-
reaucratic coordination. 
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With these criteria in mind, Congress could create a Standing Com-
mission on Presidential Inability and Unfitness, whose membership would 
stand ready to assemble, either physically or electronically, at the request 
of the Vice President. The membership could include: 
The Vice President 
The Secretary of Defense 
The Secretary of State 
The Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate 
The Speaker of the House, and the House Minority Leader 
The Chairs of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees 
Note that this structure would guarantee majority representation on 
the Committee for the party in control of the Presidency. This would be a 
critical feature in any system that seeks to avoid the appearance that the 
party that lost the previous presidential election is unilaterally reversing 
the results of that process. Even though the structure of Section Four en-
sures that the acting-President will be from the President’s own party. It is 
crucial from the standpoint of maintaining democratic legitimacy to make 
sure that, to the extent reasonably possible, the Section Four process is not 
perceived by the public as a kind of soft coup. 
It will also be crucial, while passing any legislation of this kind, to 
make sure the public understands that Section Four is being modified to 
make it possible for the political system to act appropriately in sufficiently 
extreme circumstances. Removing a president via Section Four would ob-
viously be a radical step; but it would be less radical than allowing a bla-
tantly unfit president, who has nevertheless not committed any provably 
and unambiguously impeachable offenses, to remain in office for, poten-
tially, years on end. 
In the end, the precise details of any proposed modification of Section 
Four from its present form are not as important as the pressing need for a 
national debate about how to do so appropriately. The end of the Trump 
Presidency could well provide an ideal time for such a debate, as the nation 
comes to grips with the consequences of having elected a radically unqual-
ified demagogue to the nation’s highest office.  
Indeed, one great advantage of modifying Section Four through ap-
propriate legislation is the potentially powerful prophylactic effect that 
both national debate and the legislation it eventually produces may have 
on future presidents. Aspiring demagogues, no matter how intemperate 
and erratic, would be on notice that the American political system stands 
ready to remove them if their behavior becomes sufficiently egregious. 
Such would be the case where the system could conclude that they had 
become unfit to hold the office, and not only for committing impeachable 
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offenses. A modified Section Four could work as an important counter-
force against the various trends in modern American politics and culture 
that are making it increasingly easy for unfit demagogues such as Donald 
Trump to seize power. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine the following scenario: On November 3, 2020, Donald 
Trump suffers a crushing defeat at the polls. A blue wave made up of Dem-
ocrats, Independents, and Republicans who can no longer tolerate some-
one like Trump at the head of their party votes to remove him from office. 
If this were to happen, seventy-seven days would pass before the in-
auguration of the new President. Those seventy-seven days would present 
countless opportunities for various abuses of presidential power. Given 
Donald Trump’s history of reckless behavior and contempt for both cus-
tomary and legal restraints on presidential behavior, the possibility that he 
would employ the transition period to loot the treasury; pardon himself 
and all of his cronies; use the powers of his office to punish his political 
opponents; or, as his former personal attorney suggested in his testimony 
before Congress, even attempt to overturn the results of the elections itself 
is far from merely a theoretical concern.128 
This kind of situation is precisely the sort of constitutional crisis that 
Section Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was designed to address—
even in its present, suboptimal form. We can only hope that Republican 
elites can, under such circumstances, overcome their present obsequious 
attitude toward the demagogue who has taken over their party and vigor-
ously support the use of Section Four to forestall such abuse of the powers 
of the Presidency.  
Should anything like this scenario come to pass, it will only make it 
more evident why legislative modification of Section Four is imperative. 
Certainly, no such reform can take place until the government is in the 
hands of a president and a party that has less to fear from a process that 
will make it easier, as a practical matter, to remove an obviously unfit 
demagogue from the Presidency. 
When the United States of America is once again in that circum-
stance, such a reform should be undertaken as soon as possible. Even after 
Donald Trump is, one way or another, removed from office, we will con-
tinue to navigate a political world in which the threat to democracy and 
the rule of law from aspiring presidential demagogues will still be very 
much with us. 
 
  
 128. See supra Part I. 
